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I.

PARTIES
This action arises through the efforts of the Appellants to collect a judgment

obtained against non-parties Tom and Teri Keetch. In keeping with Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(d), the Appellants will be referred to herein as "Creditors" and
the Keetches as "Debtors." The Creditors are attempting to collect their judgment not
from the Debtors, but from the attorneys who have represented the Debtors in some postjudgment proceedings. These attorneys, and the appellees, are Mr. Brennan Moss and Pia
~

Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, LLC, which are referred to herein collectively as the

"Firm" or "PADRM."
While they are not parties, the Keetches' minor son, identified as "S" and Ms.
Keetch's mother, Carol Brown ("Brown") are referred to in this brief.

vi
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II.
~

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has Jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code

section 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court has assigned this matter to this Court
of Appeals under section 78A-3-102(4).

III.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Not required in an Appellee's Brief pursuant to URAP 24(b)(l).

IV.

PERTINENT STATUTES
Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"), UCA § 25-6-1 et seq.

Specifically:

§ 25-6-2 Definitions.
vi

In this chapter: ... (12): "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute
or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an
interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien
or other encumbrance.
§ 25-6-8. Remedies of Creditors.
( 1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a

~

creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
a. avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy
the creditor's claim
b. an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred
or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

vi

c. subject to applicable principles of equity and m accordance with
applicable rules of civil procedure:
1.

an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;

1
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11.

appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred
or of other property of the transferee; or

111.

any other relief the circumstances may require.

(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor,
if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct ("URPC'). Specifically:

Rule 1.8 (e): A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in
connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: (I) a lawyer may
advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent
on the outcome of the matter; and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation, and minor expenses reasonably connected to the
litigation, on behalf of the client.

Rule 1.15 (a): A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own
property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the
lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. The
account may only be maintained in a financial institution that agrees to report to the
Office of Professional Conduct in the event any instrument in properly payable form is
presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of
whether or not the instrument is honored. Other property shall be identified as such and
appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.

Rule 1.15 (d): Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
2
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the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration (" URJA"), Article 10. In relevant portion:

Rule 14-1001 (a): A lawyer or law firm shall create and maintain an interest or
dividend-bearing trust account for client funds ("IOLTA account"). All client funds shall
be placed into this account except those funds which can earn net income for the client in
excess of the costs to secure such income, except as provided in paragraph (g).

Rule 14-1001 (d): The lawyer or law firm shall: (1) not allow earnings from an
IOLTA account to be made available to a lawyer or law firm; . . . and (4) direct the
depository institution where the IOLTA account is established:
to remit all interest or dividends, net of allowable reasonable service charges or
fees, if any, on the average monthly balance in the account, or as otherwise
computed in accordance with the institution's standard practice, at least quarterly,
solely to the Utah Bar Foundation ("Foundation"). When feasible, the depository
institution shall remit the interest or dividends on all of its IOLTA accounts in a
lump sum, however, the depository institution must provide, for each individual
uJ)

IOLT A account, the information to the Foundation required by subparagraphs
(d)(4)(B) and (d)(4)(C) of this rule ...

v.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns an alleged fraudulent transfer under the Utah Uniform

Fraudulent Transfer Act (the "UFTA") UCA § 25-6-1, et seq. The primary issue before
the Court is whether under the UFTA an attorney or law firm holding a client's funds in
an IOLTA 1 trust account is a "transferee" against whom a creditor can seek to satisfy its
1

IOLTA means "Interest On Lawyer Trust Accounts" and is used herein to describe
PADRM's client trust account in which certain funds relevant to this dispute were
deposited, and also to refer generally to accounts held by Utah law firms under Utah Rule
of Judicial Administration 14-1001.
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debt by attaching the attorney's or law firm's assets. Although the UFTA does not define
the term "transferee," and neither this Court nor the Utah .Supreme Court has yet had an
opportunity to address the meaning this term, numerous other courts interpreting their
state's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act or virtually identical provisions
contained in the Bankmptcy Code's Fraudulent Conveyance Act have addressed the
meaning of the term "transferee." The vast majority of courts to address this issue have
held that an individual or entity must have the legal right to exercise dominion or control
over the debtor's funds to qualify as a "transferee."

If an individual or entity does not

possess the legal right to exercise dominion or control over a debtor's funds, they are not
a "transferee" against whom a creditor can look for relief regardless of whether they in
~

fact held or transfer a debtor's funds.
Here, in granting PADRM's motion for summary judgment, the district court
acknowledged that neither this Court nor the Supreme Court had addressed the
requirements or meaning of the term "transferee" under the UFTA, but believed Utah
would follow the majority view and adopt the "dominion or control" test. The district
court then applied the "dominion or control" test to the following undisputed material
facts:
• The Creditors obtained a judgment against the Debtors in an unrelated
lawsuit and took steps to begin collecting its judgment. [R: 629-648; 2270 ,r
2.]
•

After the Creditors obtained the judgment, Debtors hired PADRM to
represent them in certain post-judgment procedures and to attempt to
negotiate a settlement of the judgment.

•

Once retained, PADRM received a $50,000 check drawn on an account

("Bank Account') in the name of Brown and S, with instructions to deposit
the funds in PADRM's IOLTA for the benefit of the Debtors and for use in
PADRM's effort to resolve the Judgment. [R: 1114-1117; R:2270 ,r 8.]
4
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vii

o

PADRM's attempts to settle the Debtors' obligations under the judgment
with the Creditors was unsuccessful.

•

After the Creditors rejected the settlement offer, Debtors instructed
PADRM to deduct its legal fees for services rendered, and to send the
remaining funds being held in PADRM's IOLTA to certain third parties.
PADRM did as it was directed. [R: 2270-2271.]

•

After the remaining trust funds were distributed and cleared PADRM's
IOLTA, the Creditors served a writ of garnishment on PADRM seeking to
collect any funds belonging to Debtors that were being held by PADRM.
[R: 2041-43; R: 2075.]

Based on these undisputed material facts, the district court granted summary
judgment dismissing the Creditors' claims against PADRM under the UFTA finding that
as a matter of law PADRM was not a transferee under the UFTA because it could not
legally exercise dominion or control over the Debtor's funds. To the contrary, the district
court found that PADRM was legally prohibited from exercising dominion or control
over the Debtor's trust funds for PADRM's own benefit and Debtors therefore never
uJ

disposed of, or parted with, any of their rights or interest in the funds. The district court
later dismissed the Creditors' remaining conspiracy and participation in wrongful conduct
claims again finding that the court believed Utah would follow the majority view that a

~

fraudulent transfer action cannot serve as the predicate underlying act supporting a
conspiracy claim because a fraudulent transfer-despite its title-is not a tort.
As discussed below, the Court should affirm the district court's decisions and
should adopt the majority position that an individual or entity must have the legal right to
exercise dominion or control over a debtor's funds to qualify as a transferee under the
UFTA and that the UFTA is not a tort action that can form the basis of a conspiracy

\:)

claim. Adopting the dominion or control test and the majority view that the UFTA is not
a tort will not only place Utah in the well-settled majority, advancing the goal of uniform

5
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interpretation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, but will also harmonize the
provisions of the UFTA with long-established rules governing a Utah lawyer's duties and
obligations regarding client trust funds. Moreover, as a matter of sound public policy,
adopting the majority position will avoid the serious client conflicts and draconian
consequences that Utah lawyers, banks, and other similarly situated institutions will face
if the Creditor's proposed interpretation of the UFTA is adopted.

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. PADRM Is Not Liable Under the UFTA, Because Placing Money In a
Lawyer's IOLTA Is Not a Transfer and PADRM is Not a Transferee Under
UFTA.
Placing money in an attorney's trust account is not a "Transfer," and an attorney

who deposits a client's funds in a client trust account is not a "transferee" for purposes of
the UFT A. Like a bank that must honor its checks, the attorney has no legal right to
refuse the client's instructions concerning disbursement of trust funds. Also like a bank,
funds in an attorney's IOLTA belong to the client and cannot be used for the attorney's
personal benefit; rather they are merely being held by the attorney for the benefit of the
client.

And under Utah law, a client's funds that are being held in an IOLTA are

available to a client's creditors through a writ of garnishment or execution. Therefore, the
client has not "parted with" or "disposed of' the funds as required by the UFTA to effect
a transfer. This conclusion finds further support in the Federal Court opinions following

Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.
1988). In Bonded, the Seventh Circuit held that a depository bank was not a "transferee"
because the bank was contractually and legally obligated to account to the depositor for
the funds, and thus lacked "dominion" or "control" over them. Analogously, in the
context of an IOLTA Trust Account, the funds are under the client's control, not the
attorney's.

6
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'1J

B. Because PAD RM and Mr. Moss Are Not Transferees Thev Cannot be Liable
.,
for Transfers from Debtors to Third Parties.

The UFT A provides for avoidance of a transfer and recovery from the ''first
transferee" the "person for whose benefit the transfer was made" or "any subsequent
transferee other than a good faith transferee." There is no provision in UFTA for recovery
from anyone else, such as an intermediary who participated in the transfer. Because
PADRM is not a transferee, but rather an intermediary who temporarily held its clients'
funds in trust, it cannot be liable to the Creditors under the UFTA.
Furthermore, the UFTA does not create a tort that could form the basis of a civil
conspiracy claim. UFTA does not provide an award of damages - not even against the
most culpable party - the transferor. Furthermore, proving intent is unnecessary as well.
These factors combine to determine that fraudulent transfer is not a tort. Additionally, the
legislature specifically applied certain legal principles, including estoppel, laches, and
duress to UFTA, but did not apply conspiracy. Because a fraudulent transfer is not a tort
under the UFTA, and the UFTA limits liability to transferees, there is no legal basis upon
which to extend conspiracy liability to a non-transferee. Thus PADRM cannot be held
liable under a conspiracy or participation theory for a fraudulent transfer it did not
receive.
C. Public Policy Favoring Legal Representation Requires that Law Firms
Cannot Be Held Liable for IOLTA Trust Fund Transfers Under UFTA.

If the Creditors' argument is accepted, attorneys will be forced to police the use of
their IOLTA Trust Accounts and, where clients owe debts, forbid withdrawals. The
problems with this rule are legion and obvious. First, this will make attorneys choose
between liability to creditors and violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,
which require client agreement or a bona fide lien to retain IOLTA Trust Account funds.
Second, this will create unnecessary and harmful conflicts in the attorney-client
relationship: on the one hand, the client must be forthright with counsel about debts and
obligations to obtain the best advice possible; on the other hand, by informing the
7
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attorney of debts, the attorney might have to help the creditors collect this debt. While
there is justification to permit a creditor to seek a writ and levy against an IOLTA Trust
Account balance, Creditors' proposed rule would force debtors' attorneys to act as debt
collection agents against their clients - or refuse to accept trust funds at all.

VII.

ARGUMENT - DISMISSAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS TO THE FIRST
THREE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT TRANSFER.
The first three causes of action asserted by Creditors are for fraudulent transfer

under, respectively, Utah Code sections 25-6-S(l)(b), 5(l)(a), and 6(1). But for PADRM
to be liable under these sections of the UFTA, PADRM must be a "transferee." Although
the UFTA does not define a "transferee," it logically means one who receives a
"transfer," a term that is defined in the statute. The District Court dismissed these causes
of action, finding that on undisputed facts, PADRM was not a transferee because
P ADRM did not receive a transfer. In reaching its conclusion, the district court applied
the "dominion or control" test adopted by the majority of courts to address this issue.,
While Debtor believes the Court should adopt the majority's dominion or control test,
there are also several other avenues available to the Court to affirm the district court's
ruling.

A. Depositing Money into a Law Firm's IOLTA Does Not Dispose of the Money,
and Thus Is Not a "Transfer" Under the UFTA.
Under the plain language of UFTA, and the Rules of Professional Conduct,
entrusting funds with a lawyer is not and cannot result in a transfer from the client to the
lawyer. 2 Unlike placing assets in the legal name of a friend or relative to hide them from
creditors, placing funds with a lawyer is more akin to moving money between a debtor's
2

The funds came to PADRM in the form of a check drawn on an account in the joint
name of the Keetches' minor son and Ms. Keetch's mother, not the Keetches. [R: 1178;
R: 2037-38.] The check was signed by the Keetches's minor son. [R: 1178; R: 2037-38.]
While the Court subsequently found these funds were Mr. Keetch's wages, the record
does not support a finding that P ADRM was aware of the provenance of these funds until
after this suit was filed. Even were it aware, as discussed below, PADRM was legally and
professionally unable to resist Brown's directives as to the use of the funds.
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~

own bank accounts, both in terms of the client's control over the funds, and the ability of
creditors to obtain them. The definition of transfer, while broad in the UFT A,
encompasses attempts to alienate funds so as to move them outside the grasp of creditors.
When funds are entrusted to an attorney, professional rules and creditors' remedies defeat
any such purpose without requiring - or triggering - UFT A.

1. The Text of the UFT A and the Rules of Professional Conduct
Demonstrate a Deposit Into an IOLTA is Not a Transfer.
~

The definition and treatment of transfers under UFTA is inconsistent with the
notion that a deposit into an JOLTA is a transfer. Under UFT A, a "Transfer" is defined as
"every mode ... of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset .... "
[UCA § 25-6-2(12) (emphasis added).] Additionally, UFTA addresses the timing of a
transfer, noting in relevant portion that "a transfer is made ... when the transfer is so far
perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien other than
under this chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee." [UCA § 25-6-7(1)(b).]
In the event this cannot occur, UFT A provides that "the transfer is made when it becomes
effective between the debtor and the transferee." [UCA § 25-6-7(3).] Thus the focus of
UFTA is on the disposition of an asset, and thus considers when the asset leaves the grasp
of creditors, or becomes "effective" between the debtor and transferee. This doesn't occur
with an IOLTA.
Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, "[a] lawyer shall hold property of
clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer's own property." [URPC l.15(a).] Not only are
these funds available to the client on demand, [see URPC l.15(d),] but they are fully
available to creditors through a writ of garnishment, much like a bank account (and
indeed the Creditors did just that). [See URPC l.15(d).] Since the funds are kept
"separate from the lawyer's own property" they are therefore not the lawyer's property.
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Unlike a bank, the lawyer cannot even earn income on the funds, which accrues instead
to the Utah Bar Foundation. [See URJA 14.1001.]
IOLTA funds are segregated from the lawyer's property, and are not subject to the
lawyer's control (as further discussed below). If they are not the lawyer's property, they
must remain the property of the client or third party who entrusted them to the lawyer, at
least until further directions are given to disburse them. If the funds were the client's
property before deposit into the IOLTA, and are the client's property afterwards, then
nothing was disposed of or parted with by the client, no creditor's rights were blocked,
and no transfer becomes effective as between the client and lawyer. This makes sense,
because IOLTA funds are not the lawyer's funds.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Funds were indeed deposited in
PADRM's IOLTA. [R: 2038 (Fact

iJ

8).] They were held there until Brown requested

they be disbursed. [R: [R: 2041-43. 3 ] And as IOLTA funds, they were segregated from
PADRM's own funds, never available to PADRM to use as its own funds - nothing in
the record suggests PADRM raided its IOLTA funds. Therefore, they were not
transferred.

2.

A Lawyer is Prohibited from Taking the Action the Creditors'
Legal Theory Would Require.

The Rules of Professional Conduct have a further influence on this unique
situation involving IOLTA funds. A typical transfer subjected to challenge under UFTA
might be a gift or a low-dollar asset sale. Absent a dissatisfied creditor to challenge the
transfer, the recipient is free to use the asset. However, if the potential for fraudulent
transfer liability exists, the transferee would be well advised to hold the funds (at least the
amount received in excess of value provided) pending litigation. Indeed, if the Creditors'
proposed rule of law fmn liability were the law, once PADRM knew the Debtors owed
3

Fact paragraphs 12-16 show distributions. Creditors dispute only whether Debtors or
Brown directed the distributions.
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money, it would have had to freeze the IOLTA funds to protect itself from liability to the
Creditors.
However, a lawyer is flatly prohibited from interfering with the client's rights to
the funds. The Rules of Professional Conduct provide "[ e]xcept ... by agreement with the
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive ... " [URPC l.15(d).] The only
exception to this rule concerns the situation where "a client or third person has an
interest." [URPC 1.15(d).] While Creditors will suggest they have an interest, according
to the State Bar, they do not. Thus PADRM would be subject to discipline for acting as a
collection agent against their clients, the Debtors.
Not every claim made by a third person triggers the duties ex:pressed
in Rule 1.15. . . . A third person who "has an interest" is different
from a third Rerson who merely claims an interest. ... The fact that a
third party' expects" funds held by the lawyer to be the source of
payment would not justify a lawyer's refusal to obey the instructions
of his client to tum over the entire amount. The Comment to Rule
1.15 uses the phrases "just claims" and "duty under apf licable law"
to suggest that the third party must have a matured lega or equitable
claim in order to qualify for special protection ....
Only those claims that rise to the level of a "matured legal or
eqmtable claim" constitute an "interest" and trigger the duties owed
under Rule 1.15. For example, a valid assignment of the funds . . . a
statutory or judgment lien that attaches to the specific l!.roperty or
funds in question or a court order requiring that the specific property
or funds be turned over to the third party is such an interest. A
lawyer's knowledge that the client owes bills, even if the lawyer
knows that the creditor expects to be paid out of the proceeds of a
settlement or judgment, does not give rise to such duties unless the
creditor has an interest in the proceeds within the meaning of Rule
1.15.
[Utah State Bar Ethics Opinion 00-04 (emphasis added).]
Judgment liens attach to real property upon recording. [UCA § 78B-5-202 (7).]
However, the Utah Code does not provide for any such lien attachment against a debtor's
personal property arising from a judgment. Therefore, the lien was not attached to the
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funds in PADRM's IOLTA until the writ of garnishment was served. That occurred after
PADRM had distributed the funds per instructions. [R: 2041-43; R:2074. 4 ] Thus under
published Utah State Bar ethics guidance, PADRM would have been subject to
disciplinary action for refusing to disburse the IOLTA funds as directed. PADRM could
not have acted in any way to preserve the 101TA funds for the Creditors without
violating ethical rules, and this Court should not create a rule encouraging attorney
malpractice.
PADRM's ability to ethically freeze IOLTA funds in this case was further
complicated by the source of those funds. While the Court later determined that the
Funds were property of the Debtors, this determination also post-dated their distribution
by PADRM. [R: 2085, 2090-91.] The funds in question were drawn on an account in the
name of Brown and S, and were thereby presented to PADRM as Brown's and S's funds.
[R: 1178; R: 2037-38.] Until the Court's ruling on this issue, there could be no "matured
legal or equitable claim" by Creditors on the Funds. (And even then the Creditors would
have to create a lien.) Absent such an interest in the Funds by the Creditors, PADRM had
to follow Brown's directives concerning distribution of the funds. If that subjects
PADRM to liability to the Creditors, PADRM effectively becomes the guarantor of its
clients' judgments by following applicable ethical rules. 5 This result is inimical to the

4

Affidavit indicates no service as of July 6, 2011.
The date the check was deposited into PADRM's IOLTA is not in dispute. [R: 2038
(Fact iJ 8).] Creditors attempt to imply that PADRM acted in bad faith by receiving a
check prior to a supplemental examination of the Debtors, but waiting to deposit it into its
IOLTA until after the exam. [ApJ?ellant's Brief, p. 4, 19.] The problem with this notion is
apparent from the fact that even 1f the physical check was in PADRM's possession prior
to the hearing. up until the check cleared the bank, the funds remained in the Bank
Account, and to the extent the Creditors could garnish that account, the Funds were
subject to such a writ.
Ironically, the Creditors had more access to the funds in PADRM's IOLTA than in the
Bank Account. Absent the Court's August 10, 2012 ruling, the funds in the Bank
Account were not in the Debtors' name. [R: 1178; R: 2037-38.]
5
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role of attorneys and the rights and abilities of debtors to obtain counsel, and would
violate a separate ethical rule prohibiting financial support to clients. 6

3.

UFTA Liability Is Unnecessary Because Depositing Funds in an
IOLTA Does Not Affect a Creditor's Ability to Execute on a
Judgment.

The Creditors suggest that UFT A liability is necessary because if the Finn is not
liable as a fraudulent transfer recipient, then debtors will generally be able to avoid
paying creditors by hiring counsel and placing assets in IOLTAs. This premise is entirely
false. If this were true, it would be a valuable and powerful way to avoid paying debt, and
would likely be an extremely popular service for law firms to provide - at least until the
inevitable and immediate judicial backlash. However, the Creditors cannot present a
single published opinion where a firm was found to be a transferee under UFTA, or any
other state's similar law, for accepting funds into an IOLTA or equivalent trust account. 7
6

"A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending
or contemplated litigation, except that: (e)( 1) a lawyer may advance court costs and
expenses of litigation ... ; and (e)(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation, and minor expenses ... " [URPC 8.l(e).] Thus a
lawyer may not agree to guarantee a client's judgment.
7
Creditors cite an unpublished New Jersey case, which "conclude[d] it is self-evident
that Frank, Nancy, and the Visci law firm are transferees because they are persons within
the orbit of the statutory definition of transfer." Sun Nat. Bank v. Visci, No. A-031710T4, 2011 WL 2410238, at *6 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 8, 2011) (emphasis
added). "Orbit" is not a term in the UFTA in Utah or New Jersey, and the New Jersey
Court does not provide any reasoning for this Court to follow to justify this departure
from the statutory language. Furthermore, while the UFTA 1s to be interpreted
consistently with other states, [see UCA § 25-6-12),] "[n]o unpublished opinion shall
constitute precedent or be binding upon any court . . . [and, with inapplicable exceptions,]
no unpublished opinion shall be cited by any court." [New Jersey Rule of Court 1:336-1.]
Creditors are asking this Utah Court of Appeal to follow a New Jersey decision that New
Jersey trial courts cannot even cite.
Creditors also cite an Eleventh Circuit opinion adding a "good faith" element to the
dominion and control test. See In re Harwell, 628 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2010). Unlike
Bonded, Harwell has received almost no attention outside of the Eleventh Circuit, being
cited by a handful of outside Bankruptcy Courts. Furthermore, the facts of the Harwell
case go far beyond anything in the record here. In that case, "the same day the Florida
state court quashed the writ of garnishment, Hutton issued a check on his trust account to
the Bank of Commerce for Harwell's remaining $125,000. Hutton personally visited the
bank, delivered the $125,000 check, and obtained seven cashier's checks ... " Id. at 1315.
The attorney in Harwell also admitted "these transactions were unusual and departed
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The reason this "loophole" has not been utilized is that it simply does not exist. If a
client's creditor wishes to obtain funds in an IOLTA held for that client, it need not sue
the firm, but serve a writ of garnishment - much like with a bank account.
Creditors attempt to analogize an IOLTA to a self-settled trust, where the debtor
places assets with a third party who has express instructions to ignore claims of creditors.

~

However, in crafting their hypothetical situation, they assume a scenario with no factual
connection to the record in this case, or IOLTA funds generally. PADRM obtained
summary judgment on the undisputed facts of this case, not a scenario with "trust
documents [drafted] to restrict the trustee from transferring assets to the debtor if the
debtor is insolvent." [See Creditors' Brief, p. 12.] These cases set up a false equivalency
on several levels.
First, none of the spendthrift trust cases cited concern liability on the trustee's own
assets. Second, these cases concern trustees or their debtors who refused to tum over
funds in response to garnishment proceedings. Creditors look to Territorial Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Baird created the KOA
Irrevocable Trust ("trust"), and designated his son, John Knapp Baird, as trustee.") In that
case, the creditor "served a writ of garnishment on the [trust's] lessee to garnish the lease
payments" and "served a writ of garnishment on the trustee to garnish the lease payments
and any other sums owed by the trust to Baird." Id. at 455.

The creditor in Bairc!

attempted to obtain the income of the trust, not to hold the trustee personally liable for the
judgment. Furthermore, unlike a lawyer with IOLTA funds, the trustee refused to
recognize a writ of garnishment.

from the typical handling of client trust funds." Id. Here, P ADRM was not served with a
writ of garnishment until after all funds had been disbursed, [R: 2041-43; R: 2075,] and
furthermore, the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct flatly prohibit PADRM's refusal to
disburse funds as instructed.
14
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~

Ii)

Another inapplicable case cited by Creditors is Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241,
1242 (Utah 1975). That case was brought "seeking to invalidate a spendthrift trust by
which Norma had conveyed to Valley Bank about $465,000 in assets." Id. An IOLTA is
distinguishable, as it does not contain or permit "a spendthrift clause which ... [provides]
that no payment from or share of the trust shall be liable to legal process of creditors of
any beneficiary." Id. at 1243. Additionally, unlike what the Creditors seek here, the
creditor in Leach "commenced this action to pierce the trust and satisfy the judgment
from assets Norma Anderson had conveyed to it." Id. Nothing in the Leach opinion
suggests or supports direct liability of the bank to satisfy the judgment - only to turn over
the trust funds. The same is true of the Creditors' third case. McGoldrick v. Walker, 838
P.2d 1139, 1139 (Utah 1992) ("To satisfy the judgment, Walker attempted to reach
certain real property held in trust by plaintiffs. He moved to void the trust and foreclose
on the property.") Finally, Creditors cite to another case where the debtor outright
transferred property, not a trust. Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78,

1 6,

132 P.3d 63, 65

("Robert signed and deeded all of his real properties to Ralph and Mary, as joint tenants.
The trial court later found that this 'made [Robert] insolvent by virtue of the transfer."')
Although IOLT As are "trust accounts" they bear no similarity to the trusts in these
cases. Unlike a trust designed to protect assets or frustrate creditors, IOLTAs are
governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which protect creditors with interests in
the funds .Where a creditor has an actual lien against the funds, the firm is required to
recognize that lien. Furthermore, unlike actual trusts, a creditor can readily attach IOLTA
funds through a writ of garnishment, without resort to UFTA.
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B. Utah Should Follow the Reasoned Decisions of the Majority of Courts That
Require a "Transferee" to be Someone who Exercise Dominion or Control
Over an Asset.

1. Courts Interpreting Utah and Other States' UFTA Statutes
Turn to Bankruptcy Law For Guidance.
As with UFTA, it is necessary under Bankruptcy Law to determine where the line
between a courier or intermediary and an actual transferee lies. UFTA provides for
judgment "against: (a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the
transfer was made ... " [UCA §25-6-9(2).] This language parallels the Bankruptcy Code,
which provides for recovery "from- ( 1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the
entity for whose benefit such transfer was made ... " [11 USC § 550(a).] It is particularly
useful to look to Bankruptcy Law not only because of the similarity of language, but
"because the Bankruptcy Code was the model for the provision of Utah's Fraudulent
Transfer Act that distinguishes between initial and subsequent transferees." Wing v.

Harrison, No. 2:03 CV 26DAK, 2004 WL 966298, at *3 (D. Utah Apr. 29, 2004); see
also Fid. Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Brand, 371 B.R. 708, 719 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("[w]hen
drafting the model U~form Fraudulent Transfer Act, the authors looked to the federal
Bankruptcy Code for guidance." citing Michael L. Cook and Richard E. Mendales, The

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 Am. Bankr.L.J. 87, 87
(1988)).
For this reason, other courts frequently tum to Bankruptcy law to interpret UFTA
statutes. Texas has also adopted the UFTA, where "[n]either the former nor current
fraudulent transfer statutes define a 'transferee.' However, the Fifth Circuit, in addressing
the issue of avoidable transfers under the Bankruptcy Code, has defined a transferee as a
party who has legal dominion or control over the funds ... " Newsome v. Charter Bank

Colonial, 940 S.W.2d 157, 165-66 (Tex. App. Houston [14 Dist.] 1996) (citing Matter of
Coutee, 984 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir.1993) (applying Bonded Financial Services)). That
Court noted that
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[w]hile there is evidence that the Bank engaged in a number of
imprudent transactions . . . the Bank did not own these funds or
otherwise benefit from these transactions, but was simply complying
with its depositors' instructions to pay Dr. Johnson. . . . any
knowledge the Bank might have had .at the time of the various
transactions about the source of funds in other accounts, an issue
hotly contested at trial, would not have bestowed the Bank with
dominion or control over such funds."

Id. Another Texas Court explained that "Under that [dominion/control test] definition, a
bank impounding funds under a writ of garnishment would not qualify as a transferee,

nor would a law firm holding its client's money in trust, because neither could freely
spend the funds in its possession." Wohlstein v. Aliezer, 321 S.W.3d 765, 776 (Tex.
App. Houston [14 Dist.] 2010) (emphasis added).

If Utah is to interpret UFTA "to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it," [UCA § 25-611,] then this Court should harmonize with the published Texas decisions adopting the
dominion or control tests from Bankruptcy Law first outlined in Bonded. It should
disregard the unpublished New Jersey case, which is not even the law in New Jersey.

2.

The Dominion or Control Test Limits Transferees to Those Who
Can Control Their Fate.

Establishing the definition of "transfer" provides an opportunity for a reasonable,
or a disastrous rule of law. Imagining a debtor who mails a check to a relative as a gift to
keep the funds away from creditors, it would be equally absurd under UFTA to define
transferee to: i) exclude the relative who receives the funds; or ii) include the letter
carrier. However, under the literal definition of "transfer" taken without context and
under the broad approach suggested by Creditors, either could be a transferee. Utah
should solve this problem the same way that the Bankruptcy Courts have.
Judge Easterbrook, for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, authored the seminal
case on this issue, which has been widely followed. Because it is common for funds to be
transferred by check, and through the use of the banking system, this case concerns a
creditor who sought to hold a bank liable for avoidance of a fraudulent transfer
17
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accomplished when the bank accepted a check for a depositor's account. See Bonded, 838
F .2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
The functions of fraudulent conveyance law lead us to conclude that
the Bank was not the "initial transferee" of Bonded's check even
though it was the payee. The Bank acted as a financial intermediary.
It received no benefit. Ryan's loan was fully secured and not m
arrears, so the Bank did not even acquire a valuable right to offset its
loan against the funds in Ryan's account. Under the law of contracts,
the Bank had to follow the instructions that crune with the check.
The Uniform Commercial Code treats such instructions as binding to
the extent any contract binds (see UCC § 3-119).FN2 The Bank
therefore was no different from a courier or an intermediary on a
wire transfer; it held the check only for the purpose of fulfilling an
instruction to make the funds available to someone else.

Id. at 893. The Court also reasoned that:
We are aware that some courts say that an agent (or a bank in a case
like ours) is an "initial transferee" but that courts may excuse the
transferee from repaying using equitable powers. See, e.g.,
Colombian Coffee Co., 75 B.R. at 179-80 (alternative holding); In re
C-L Cartage Co., 70 B.R. 928 (Bkr.E.D.Tenn.1987). This is
misleading. "Transferee" is not a self-defining term; it must mean
something different from "possessor" or "holder" or "agent". To
treat "transferee" as "anyone who touches the money'' and then to
escape the absurd results that follow is to introduce useless steps; we
slice these off with Occam's Razor and leave a more functional rule.

Id. at 894.
Other courts have adopted Judge Easterbrook's reasoning, which has developed
into what is known as the "dominion" or "control" test. For instance, the 9th Circuit BAP
explained, "that the dominion test is more restrictive than the 'control test' used by other
circuits." In re Viola, 469 B.R. 1, 6 (9th Cir. BAP 2012). "Under the dominion test, a
transferee is one who ... has dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the
money to one's own purposes. The inquiry focuses on whether an entity had legal
authority over the money and the right to use the money however it wished." In re

Incomnet, Inc., 463 F .3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Under
the "control" test, "[w ]hen banks receive money for the sole purpose of depositing it into
a customer's account, on the other hand, the bank never has actual control of the funds
and is not a section 550 initial transferee. This is true even when, after a bank deposits the
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money into a customer's account, the customer gives the money to the bank to pay off a
debt that it owes to the bank." In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 848 F.2d 1196, 1200 (11th
Cir. 1988) (internal citations and quote marks omitted). This test was adopted in the
Tenth Circuit as well. See In re First Sec. Mortg. Co., 33 F.3d 42, 44 (10th Cir. 1994)
("We find the reasoning of the Bonded court to be persuasive in deciding the case before
us.); Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1996) (confirming the adoption of
Bonded stating "the minimum requirement of status as a 'transferee' is dominion over the
l.jp

money or other asset, the right to put the money to one's own purposes."); In re Ogden,
314 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002) ("courts construing these provisions have held that
certain entities receiving the debtor's funds are not "transferees" but rather "financial
conduits.")
While generally applied to banks holding customer deposits, this reasoning has
also been applied to law firms holding funds in trust for clients. The Fifth Circuit has
found that "funds ... deposited into the firm's trust account, as opposed to its business
account ... were held merely in a fiduciary capacity." Matter of Coutee, 984 F.2d 138,
141 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court noted that "the firm was not free at that time simply to
keep the money. The only control exercised over the funds was the control delegated to
the law firm by the [the party depositing the funds]. . .. The law firm had no legal right to
put the funds to its own use, and thus lacked the requisite dominion required to be the

V!J

initial transferee." Id. Like the various Federal Circuit Courts discussed above, this Court
should apply the dominion and/or control tests to detennine whether the Firm is a
"transferee" for purposes of the UFTA.
Creditors criticize this Bankruptcy doctrine, but do so by first misunderstanding it
to suggest that the dominion test would negate UFTA as to interests in assets. 8 Creditors
8

.

Creditors have claimed in the alternative that an "interest" was transferred because the
Debtors could "no longer use an A TM card ... nor could [they] write a check to access
the funds ... " By this logic, funds are transferred from a depositor to a bank upon losing
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suggest that a lienholder lacks dominion over the asset, and thus the Bankruptcy Courts
would permit the fraudulent creation of a lien. The first flaw in this argument is that the
lienholder has dominion or control over the lien; the second is that it would require an
astounding level of naivete in the Federal Courts. What the Bankruptcy doctrine does
accomplish is separating one who actually receives an asset or interest, from an
intermediary who merely holds the asset.

3.

Under the Dominion and/or Control Tests, PADRM Is Not a
Transferee.

Applying the dominion and control tests to the undisputed facts in this case
demonstrates that PADRM is not a transferee. PADRM deposited the funds it received in
its IOLTA, not its business account. [R: 2037-38 (Fact

if 7-8).] PADRM is prohibited

from using IOLTA funds for any purpose, or even earning interest, while they are held in
trust (banks use deposited funds to support their lending activities). [URPC 1.15; URJA
14-1001.] Eventually, all of the money held by PADRM was used in the sole discretion
of Brown, not PADRM. [R: 2041-43 (Facts,

iJ

12-16).] To the extent the Creditors

dispute this fact, it is to suggest (without proper evidence) that PADRM acted at the
direction of the Debtors - still not that PADRM acted on its own account. [Id.] Thus
PADRM was not only unable to "to put the money to [its] own purposes," Incomnet, 463
F.3d at 1070, it "receive[ d] money for the sole purpose of depositing it into a customer's
account ... [and] never ha[d] actual control of the funds." Chase & Sanborn, 848 F.2d at
1200.

an ATM card, running out of checks, or moving money between a checking and savings
account. Were that the case, "first transferee" liability could be defeated by having a
debtor move money from a savings account to a checking account, and then writing a
check to a "subsequent transferee."
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iv

4.

Use of IOL TA Funds to Pay Legal Fees to PAD RM Does Not
Alter the Analysis.

Creditors assert that PADRM benefitted from the IOLTA funds, because some of
the funds were used to pay PADRM's legal fees. [Appellant's Brief, p. 19.] Creditors
muddle their message by confusing the deposit of funds into the IOLTA with the use of a
portion of those funds to purchase legal services. Prior to transferring the payment from
PADRM's IOLTA to PADRM's operating account, there is no transfer for the reasons set
forth above. To the extent that IOLTA funds are used for the payment of fees, "a transfer
is not voidable ... if: (a) the transfer was made by the debtor: (i) in payment of or in
exchange for . . . services ... obtained by the debtor . . . from a merchant in the ordinary
course of the merchant's business." [UCA § 25-6-9(7).] A "merchant" is defined with
reference to the UCC, [UCA § 25-6-9(8),] which includes ''a person who . . . by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction." [UCA § 70A-2-104.] P ADRM is a lawyer and law
firm, [R: 2036 (Fact

,r

1),] and as such holds itself out as having knowledge or skill

peculiar to the practice of law.

C. Adopting the Rule Suggested by the Appellant Would Eliminate or
Substantially Alter the Ability of Attorneys to Represent Judgment Debtors.
This Court should affirm the decision of the District Court because it comports
with the text of the statute, and the overwhelming weight of precedent, both within and
outside of Utah, concerning UFTA and similar fraudulent transfer claims where a bank or
attorney holds funds without the right to use or control them. There is another reason this
Court should adopt these commonsense interpretations as well - they foster beneficial
public policy and the availability of counsel, as well as permitting the existence of typical
attorney-client relationships. A ruling in favor of the Creditors would upend attorneyclient relationships and the established duties of lawyers to clients.
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1. Refusal to Adopt the Dominion or Control Test Would
Create Unjust Results.
One could imagine a transfer of assets (fraudulent or otherwise) which proceeds as
follows: the officer of a company decides to transfer money to another company across
town. The officer directs the bookkeeper to prepare a check and present it for signature.
The bookkeeper then takes the signed check to the mail room, where it is placed in an
envelope, stamped, and given to the post office. A letter carrier delivers it to the other
company, where an assistant opens the mail and takes the check to that company's
bookkeeper. That bookkeeper then carries the check to the bank and gives it to a teller.

~

From the bank teller, the check goes through the Federal Reserve clearing operation, and
as a result of the check, the first company's bank sends money to the second company's
bank, where the funds are made available to the second company to spend. From this
simple example, at least nine people or organizations have "possession" of the funds in
some manner, and all are within the "orbit" of the transfer.
Yet if any of these parties (other than the second company) were considered a
transferee and were held liable under UFTA, the result would be both unjust and
impractical. Absent embezzlement by one of the participants in the chain, logic dictates
the second company be the first transferee. Otherwise, every time a letter carrier picked
up a check, or a bookkeeper wrote one, they would face personal liability if the transfer
happened to violate UFTA. The only party in that example with any control over the
funds is the second company - who could either refuse to accept funds if it knew the first
company to be insolvent, sequester them pending creditor claims, or carefully document
whatever value was provided in return for the payment.
In that example, PADRM would be most analogous to the first company's bank,
which holds the funds at the direction of the client or depositor. Had that bank taken the
funds for its own purposes and refused to honor the check, it would have liability apart
from UFTA. Similarly, had PADRM used the Funds for its own purposes, and denied the
client's instructions to disburse them, it would be subject to liability apart from UFTA as
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well (and likely disbarment). Thus the Creditors would ask this Court to impose liability
viP

on PADRM for acting in the manner it was legally bound to act.
2.

Refusing to Adopt the Dominion or Control Test Would Rewrite
the Rules of Professional Conduct and Alter Attorney-Client
Relationships.

If the Creditors' proffered rule becomes law, firms will be unable to hold funds on
behalf of clients who happen to be judgment debtors. There are a number of legitimate
reasons to hold funds for a debtor client: the debtor may be the plaintiff in another matter
and receive settlement proceeds, the attorney might hold funds to make agreed-upon
payments for the client, or (like here) the attorney may hold funds to use to attempt to
settle the debt. However, under the Creditors' proposed rule, once a firm holds IOLTA
funds of a judgment debtor, the firm is liable to pay the judgment amount (up to the
balance of IOLTA funds) to the creditor unless the firm freezes those funds for the
benefit of that creditor.
vj

If the creditor obtains a lien on the IOLTA funds, then the firm is obligated under

URPC 1.15(d) to freeze those funds for the benefit of the creditor. However, where the
creditor does not obtain such a lien, the firm is obligated to obey the client's directives.

[See Ethics Opinion 00-04, supra.] Thus by accepting funds not subject to a lien, the
attorney becomes the guarantor of the client's judgment. The Utah Bar Ethics Committee
has already opined that an attorney may not guarantee obligations for a client. In
considering whether an attorney may indemnify an opposing party for liability for paying
settlement funds (such as against a client's creditor, claiming the opposing party should
have held the funds to pay that creditor's lien), the committee found "a personal
indemnification agreement by a lawyer is, in essence, an agreement by the lawyer to
provide financial assistance to the client ... This is unethical for several reasons." [Ethics
Opinion 11-01,

iI 9.]

If providing indemnity to an opposing party to assist in obtaining

settlement is an improper benefit to a client, then clearly guaranteeing the client's own
obligations is also an improper benefit.
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Since an attorney cannot provide this benefit, the attorney would have to refuse to
accept funds from any client the attorney knew or thought to be a judgment debtor. This
is a substantial departure from current rules of practice which should rightfully be
undertaken on notice and comment, and not on ex post review by this Court.
It is also ethically improper because it creates a conflict of interest between the
client and the lawyer. In the context of indemnifying settlements, the committee
explained, "[t]he lawyer's interest in avoiding potential liability in an unknown amount to
an unknown third party is pitted against the client's need to achieve settlement and
receive funds. This poses a clear concurrent conflict of interest in violation of Utah Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2)." [Ethics Opinion 11-01,

iJ

10.] By setting up his

conflicting financial interest between firm and judgment-debtor-client, the firm would
have to interrogate its clients before accepting any funds, in order to determine whether
the client was a judgment debtor. The effects of this are even more troubling, as in order
to obtain unfettered representation, the client would have to conceal its debts from the
attorney, complicating the relationship.
VIII. ARGUMENT - DISMISSAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS TO THE
FOURTH AND FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSPIRACY. 9
A. UFTA Excludes Conspirator Liability By Its Text.
As an alternative to avoidance as "transferees" under UFTA, the Creditors allege
that PADRM participated in a "civil conspiracy'' to engage in a fraudulent transfer, and
that Mr. Moss "participated in PADRM's fraudulent transfer." As indicated by the trial
court, Creditors' "counsel clarified at the hearing the [fifth cause of action.] . . . is an
effort by plaintiffs to obtain a judgment against Mr. Moss individually." [See Ruling and
Order, Dec. 24, 2014, p. 2 in Appellant's Appendix; R: 2400.] However, there is no such
cause of action as conspiracy to engage in a fraudulent transfer. UFTA incorporates
9

Creditors do not on appeal that their fifth cause of action alleges anything more than a
conspiracy to engage in a fraudulent transfer.
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various legal doctrines, but does not incorporate conspiracy. Furthermore, fraudulent
transfer does not· qualify as a predicate act under established civil conspiracy doctrine,
nor does it provide for damages - another necessary element.
UFTA is not a common law tort, but is a statute-based provision permitting a
creditor to recover assets not held in the name of the debtor. It lists ce1tain formulas to
determine when transferred assets may be subject to the claims of creditors. [See UCA §§
25-6-5, -6.] It also sets for its own remedies, [see UCA § 25-6-8,] and limitations on
those remedies. [See e.g. UCA § 25-6-9.] It provides for judgment against "transferees,"
[UCA § 25-6-9(2),] but does not provide for damages. It also specifies which legal
doctrines apply to it, providing that "the principles of law and equity, including merchant
~

law and the law relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or
invalidating cause, supplement this chapter's provisions." [UCA § 25-6-11.] Notably

~

absent from the list is "conspiracy," which is strong evidence that the legislature did not
intend to permit avoidance of transfers via claims against "conspirators" who are not
"transferees."

B. UFTA Is Not a Tort, Which Is an Element of Conspiracy.
Furthermore, the principles of conspiracy law are not compatible with UFT A.
Civil conspiracy is not a free-standing cause of action. See Coro/es v. Sabey, 2003 UT
App 399,

,r

35, 79 P.3d 974, 983. Rather, it is a theory under which a plaintiff may

recover from multiple defendants for an underlying tort. See Id. Thus, to prove a civil
conspiracy, the plaintiffs must show that P ADRM engaged in an underlying tort, See

Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362,

,r 21,

199 P .3d 971, 978, and that there was a

meeting of the minds between P ADRM and Debtors as to the object to be accomplished
or course of action and damages. See Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790
,a

(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Creditors cannot make this showing.
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Creditors argue that PADRM is liable for conspiracy to effectuate a fraudulent
conveyance because it conspired to assist the Debtors in transfers that violated the
UFTA. 10 Thus, the only underlying conduct alleged to support the conspiracy claim is
that P ADRM engaged in transfers that violated the UFTA. This alleged conduct is
insufficient to support a ci vii conspiracy claim because it is not a valid tort claim against
PADRM. 11 For the reasons set forth above, PADRM is not a transferee under the UFTA
and, thus, the fraudulent conveyance claims against P ADRM fail as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Creditors have failed as a matter of law to state any valid underlying
claim as to PADRM upon which to predicate their civil conspiracy claim. 12
Consistent with this recognition, courts have found a plaintiff cannot recover
against a non-transferee for a fraudulent conveyance because the plaintiff should not be
able to work a runaround on the limitations of a fraudulent conveyance action by simply
pleading a civil conspiracy claim against a non-transferee. GATX Corp. v. Addington, 879
F. Supp. 2d 633, 650 (E.D. Ky. 2012), certificate of appealability denied (Oct. 15, 2012).
The limitations of the UFTA-that fraudulent conveyances are not actionable against
non-transferees-would be completely undennined if the Creditors' civil conspiracy
claim to effect a fraudulent transfer is allowed to proceed. It would also run afoul of Utah
law recognizing that there must be liability for the claim that underlies the civil

[R: 147-48, ,r 65 ("Defendants, PADRM and Moss, conspired with each other to carry ·
out the means to effectuate a fraudulent transfer; as alleged above [in the first, second,
and third causes of action alleging violations of the UFTA J").]
1
~ Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Under
Utah law, civil conspiracy requires, as one of its essential elements, an underlym~ tort.")
(citing Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 856 P.2d 1282, 1290 n. 17 (Utah 1993) and (findmg that
parties were effectively barred from litigating civil conspiracy claim where the tort claims
upon which the civil consJ?.iracy claim was predicated had been dismissed with prejudice)
(applying Utah law on civd conspiracy)).
12
Whipple v. Utah, 2:10-CV-811-DAK, 2011 WL 4368568 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2011)
report and recommendation adopted, 2:IOCV811DAK, 2011 WL 4368830 (D. Utah Sept.
19, 2011) ("Because the court concludes that Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a valid
copyright infringement claim as to Millard County, the court concludes that Plaintiffs
civil conspiracy claim fails because it lacks a valid underlying tort claim.").
10
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conspiracy claim for a civil conspiracy claim to proceed. See Id.; Jackson, 462 F.3d at
vj

1238.
In addition, under Utah law the underlying claim for a civil conspiracy must be
one sounding in tort. Puttuck, 199 P.3d at 978. A majority of courts have found that a
fraudulent transfer claim does not sound in tort, but is essentially a contract claim.

13

Moreover, courts have recognized that a fraudulent transfer is not a tortious act because
the statute does not speak in terms of liability for a wrongful act or in terms of money
damages, but rather speaks in terms of a transfer of property being null and void and
authorizing means to avoid the transfer.

14

The theory of recovery is cancellation of the

transfer or recovery of the value of the asset or amount of the debt, whichever is less,
from transferees rather than general liability for the consequences of a wrongful act such
as in the case of a tort. Id. Utah courts have similarly recognized the UFTA as a statute
that provides creditors a remedy against debtors for the payment of debts and it
establishes the grounds for setting aside a debtor's transfer of property as a fraudulent
conveyance. 15 This Court should, therefore, follow the majority of courts that have

13

vj)

See GATX Corp., 879 F.Supp.2d at 648 (citing F.D.IC. v. S. Prawer & Co., 829 F.
Supp. 453, 455 (D. Me. 1993) (following "[o]ther courts [that] have persuasively
concluded that actions to set aside fraudulent conveyances under the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act are in the nature of contract rather than tort actions.")); see also
Edwards v. Airline Support Grp., Inc., 138 So. 3d 1209, 1211-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (continuing to follow the majority view that a fraudulent transfer is not a tortious
act). Courts reaching this conclusion have reasoned that the "gravamen of [a fraudulent
transfer] cause of action ... is the ordinary right of a creditor to receive payment; this right
has been implemented by the protection of legislation concerning the circumstances
under which the creditor may avail himself of assets which the debtor has transferred to
others." S. Prawer & Co., 829 F. Supp. at 456 (quoting United States v. Franklin
National Bank, 376 F.Supp. 378,382 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)).
14
See Branch v. F.D.LC., 825 F. Supp. 384, 419 (D. Mass. 1993). The provisions of
UFTA, e.g. Utah Code Ann. §§25-6-8 and 25-6-9, like the provisions of ilie bankruptcy
provisions cited and relied on in Branch, provide for setting aside a transfer, reclaiming .
the property transferred, or collecting the value of the asset transferred or the amount
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less.
15
Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78, ~ 13, 132 P.3d 63, 66 ("The UFTA provides
[creditors] a remedy against debtors who seek to defraud a creditor or avoid a debt.")
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recognized that fraudulent transfer claims are essentially contract claims because they
arise under statutes, like Utah's, that simply codify the circumstances when and means by
which a creditor is entitled to recover the assets of a debtor to pay an outstanding debt
when the debtor has placed the assets beyond the reach of a creditor.
Thus, even if the Creditors had been able to establish a valid UFTA claim against
P ADRM, such a claim cannot serve as the tort to underlie the plaintiffs' civil conspiracy
claim. Creditors have pied no other torts. Accordingly, they have failed to allege an
essential element of their civil conspiracy claim. And Attorneys are entitled to summary
judgment against the Creditors on their fourth and fifth causes of action.

C. The Lack of Damages Under UFTA Provides an Independent Reason to Deny
Conspiracy Liability.
Conspiracy requires more than an underlying tort; it also requires "damages as a
proximate result thereof." Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 (Utah 1993). As
set forth above, creditors do not suffer "damages" from a fraudulent transfer; they obtain
the remedy of "avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy
the creditor's claim." [UCA § 25-6-8(1 )(a).] Subject to certain limitations, they can
obtain this remedy from the "first transferee" or "any subsequent transferee." [UCA § 256-9(2).] There is no provision in UFTA that provides for "damages" to a creditor. This
makes sense, because (in the event the creditor is a tort judgment creditor) the damages
are whatever the creditor suffered in order to obtain the judgment against the debtor in
the first place. That happened regardless of the transfer. The creditor isn't "damaged
again" when assets are transferred away - this would be double-counting of damages.
Thus even if this Court accepts the Creditors' argument that a violation of UFTA is a
predicate act for conspiracy, the Creditors cannot show "damages as a proximate result
thereof."
(internal citations and quotations omitted). In addition, a "claim" is defined as a "right to
payment" under UFTA. [Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3).]
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Therefore, the Creditors fail to establish a second element of conspiracy, and the
judgment dismissing the fourth and fifth causes of action should be affirmed.
IX.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the orders of the District
~

Court granting summary judgment dismissing Creditors' complaint it its entirety.
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